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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE M. WHITELEY, 
Plaintiff and R·espondent, 
vs. 
JOHN De VRIES, BARBARA D·e-




M. L. EWEL.L, doing business as 
Ewell Plumbing and Heating, 
Defendant I{}Jnd Appellant 
BRIEF OF AP'PELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 7314 
This iS' an ap·peal by the defendant Ewell from a 
judgment foreclosing 't~o mortgages given by the de-
fendants De Vries to the plaintiff Whiteley and foreclos-
ing as a mortgage a Warranty D·eed given by the de-
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fendants De V:rjes to the p1laintiff Whiteley for a consid-
eration I of $60().00- :and subordinating- _.Ewell's lien for 
labor and materrals to the lien of the two mortgages 
above referre.d. to. The d~fendant-Ewell_has appealed. 
The Complaint of the plaintiff is in thre·e caus·es of 
action, the first two being for the foreclosure of notes 
and mortgages dated March lOth and April 15, 1947 for 
$4,000.00 and $1,000.00 respectively,· and the· third cause 
of action to declare ·the· Warranty D·eed -given by the 
defendants DeVries to plaintiff under date of ·JUly 31, 
1947 to be a mortg~ge to secure:·a loan:of$600.00Jmade 
by the plaintiff to the defe·ndants D.eVries· at 1fu.atrtime . 
. No ;·note was ta~en _by :tk.e- plaintiff·:to -evidence the 
claimed loan of $600.00 at the time of the-delivery,of the 
Warranty Dee~ (Tr.:·.P·;M). A documentary s'tamp was 
attached to the Deed and it was recorded on the same 
day of its date, July 31, 1947 (Exhibit "'C"). 
On June 25, 1947 defendant Ewell had entered into 
a contract with the DeVries to 'do·the plumbing work on 
the buildings then being constructed on the premises in 
question and betwe·en Jun·e 27th and ·July 2B, 1947 had 
p·erformed l~b.or ~d ·supp,lied (lnaterial in the perfor-
mance of the work to the value of $724.57 (Exhibit 1). 
Up to that time he had received no money on account 
and he refused to _proceed further (Record p·. 108). 
About that time Mr. Gaddis, who was the fin'ancial 
: ag.ent for .rthe plaintiff . (Record p. 101), called the· plain-
tiff:-and.·ask~d to know if-he, the plaintiff, would be inter-
ested :in Jatting .D·eVries have .$600.00 ·more so that .he 
can g~t-the j-ob finishe·d.(Record pp. 124-5). .. The plaintiff 
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met De \-r ries and Gaddis on the job and DeVries told 
him that the plumber Ewell would not go any further 
unless he had $600.00, and if plaintiff would let him have 
$600.00 more he would give him a Warra~ty D·ee~d for 
for the property. Mr. Gaddis said, ''We'll take a deed 
to this property from you if Whiteley will let you ha:\lie 
the $600.00, and at the end of sixty days if you pick 
up the $600.00 you can have the D·eed back and then the 
two first and second mortgages will rid-H.'' ( R·ecord p. 
126). E\\Tell was not present at this conversation. 
Later, probably July 31st, D·eVries came into Gad-
dis's office and Gaddis told him, "Mr. Whiteley de-
mands a Warranty Deed to the prop,erty if he gives you 
this third loan of $600.00. '' (Record p. 101). Mr. DeVries 
gave Whiteley the deed which was immediately recorded 
and Whiteley gave Gaddis the check for $600.00 for 
Ewell to return 'to work and complete the job. He told 
Mr. Gaddis to pay the plumber and se-e that the work was 
done (Record p. 127). 
~fr. Ewelf did return to the job and from July 31, 
1947 until August 22, 1947 he performed additional work 
and supplied additional materials of a value of $1838.96, 
making a total of $2,463.53 on which only $600.00 had 
been paid (Exhibit 1). Mr. Ewell's claim of lien (Exhibit 
2) was for an unpaid balance of $1,514.75, this amount 
being based upon 'the original contract price for the work 
to be done by him. 
DeVries abandoned the prop·erty after paying 
Whiteley some $50.00 on the obligations and without 
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paying Whiteley the $(300.00 and picl9ng_ up the War-
• I.. . :l ,', .. • • . 
rant~ DeeQ.. 
In the, judgmen.t the co;qrt declared the lien of the 
' ' - : } • ~ '· - • • ~ • • • • • • • • J 
mortgages for $4~000.00 and $1,000.00 with interest and 
... ,.. • ,• ~ , , ~ , ', I , ,. . ' , I ' • , 
a~to:r:n~y'.s f:ee~.;to be pTior:to the_clairo of the· defendant 
r • - ~ • ) . • • - .., ~ "' • ,. ' ~ . • . • • • 
E_well and in effect held the defendant Ewell's claim to 
~ ~ , . . , . . r , - ·' . . . . ~ ~ , , .· ., . . , 
h~. prior .to the._ pla,intiff~s .-claim. on the_alleged loa~ of 
I . .. . . .·... . . . •.. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 
$(>QO.OO (Reco:rd. pp .. 65-·()). 
. ,., . . .... · ~ . '· . ,·· . . ·' . . 
STATEMENT OF ERR10RS R.ELIED UPON 
1. The trial court erred in making Finding of Fact 
No. 11 (Tr. p. 58) wherein the.courtfound that the War-
ranty Deed was in fact a third ·mortgage to secure the 
payment of $·600.00; 
·2.·· 'The trial· court erred -in Finding of Fact No. 
10 (Tcr. p. 58) that plaintiff's lien i~ paramount and sup-
·erior to the liens. and claims of ·all other d·e.fendants in 
this action as ·to the first an·d s·e-cond caus·es of action. 
3. The trial court erred in overruJ.i.ng th~ objec-
tions of the defendant to the conclusions and irrevelant 
and -immate.rial questions obj·ecte·d to by the defendant 
to the questions asked the witnes'S Gaddis. 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to strike the 
conclusions of the witness Gaddis· relative to the nature 
of the transaetion, which motions were made by the de-
fendant. 
5.- The 'trial · court ·erred · in entering judgment 
against ·this defendant. 
6. The . trial, court ·erred in dEfnying defendant's 
motion for a new,~rial., 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial C·ourt Erred in Making Finding Of 
Fact No's. 10 and 11 Subordmat'ilng Defe(Y/)aant's 
Lien T~o Plaintiff's Mortgages. 
The evidence in this case is clear that. the plaintiff 
\vas desirous_ of getting the motor court ·completed .and 
r~uested-and induced Ewell to complete the work. The 
plaintiff knew on July·.31st and before that Ewell had 
already-done-considerable work on the p~roperty and·th·at 
he. had· refused to continue unle~ss he was. paid at least 
$600.00 .. In·. order to -induce Ewell to continu·e the work 
he gave, Gaddis, his own agent, $600.00 for: the -purpose, 
with instructions to p·ay it to Ewell and continue the 
work and took from DeVries a Warranty Deed to the 
prop~rty in que~tion with an agre.ement, of" which Ewell 
had no knowle·dge, that he would :give the deed back to 
DeVries if DeVries paid him $600.00 within sixty days .. 
Under the circumstances the. situation .is such that 
the work in effect was done at the plaintiff's request 
and in order for him, the plaintiff, to obtainthe benefit 
of the work already done and the work to be done 
there~after. 
This Court has. held in the case of The -Gary-Lombard 
Lumber Company v. Thomas W. F(J)rtridg·e, 10 Utah 322, 
37 Pac. 572 that a lien will atta:ch to a later interest ac-
quired by one who authorizes work.. 'The C·ourt said: 
''Such lien under the statute may also be ex-
tended to. any other or greater interest which 
such owner may acquire to such property there-
after, and before the lien is. established. by pro-
cess of law.'' 
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A case which seems to he most nearly in point on the 
facts with the cas·e at bar is that of liitncolm v. Hamilt,on 
et ·al, 198 N. W. 289, decide.d by the Supreme Court of 
Minneso't:a on April 11, 19·24. In this case the Van ·sant 
Trust Company, who claimed to be a mortgagee, ap;.. 
pealed from a decision of t'he lower court holding that its 
mortgage was subordinate to that of a lien claimant. 
The trust ·company had forclos·ed a mortgage but the 
period of redemption had not exp;ired. Plain!tiff entered 
into a contract with a representative of the mortgagor 
to remodel a home. The trust company assented to the 
work. The court, in affirming the decision of the lower 
court, said : 
''There can be no doubt rut all that both de-
fendant and Hamilton assented to the in1prove-
ment. A question is made as to whether the former 
is. an 'owner' of the premis.es within the meaning 
of the mechanic's lien statute. We think that it is. 
To he an owner within the meaning of this statute 
does not require absolute ownership. Benjamin 
v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 517, 26 N. W. 725. It is there 
pointed out that an owner is ordinarily 'one hav-
ing dominion over a thing.' No one had so much 
dominion over the real estate in question as de-
f·endant Van Sant Company. The title records 
indicated that it was the absolute owner. Upon 
the record before us, admirably reduced to its 
lowest terms by the finding, defendant eannot 
be permitted now to assert that it is not the owner 
so as to relieve the property of plaintiff's lien. 
Whe~e the legal title to real es,tlat.e is in the mort-
gagee who assents t:o an improvement, his title 
is subject to the lien arising from the i!Jnprove-
ment.'' (Italics ours). 
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Another cas.e which supports the Appellant's posiiton 
is that of JQvne8 ·v •. · Mawsorn-Feterson Ilumber ·Gompawy, 
· 150 Pae. (2d)' 795 decided by :the Supreme Court of. Colo-
rado July· 3, 1944. In· this cas-e· the Lumber Company 
furnished ·lun1ber to -build .a, garage to one ()sbo·rn.e: who 
·had a lease on the. property. A -Mrs. Siltamaki furnish·ed 
. ,the:money to- Osborne for the- building. ·The evidence ·was 
in conflict as to-whether or not Mrs-.: Siltamaki auth·Q.pized 
.the·. woFk. ~.The material·was~ furnished: during the -month 
.. jof July. In October Mrs. Siltamaki acqtrlredth·e- fee sim-
.. :ple. title .. ·.The court at page 797 says -the following: 
''That Mrs. ·siltamaki ·had· ·an interest to 
which the lien·~ would\· attach is: supported by the 
following cases: .C.aty· Hardware Co. v. McCarty, 
10 Colo. App. 200, 50 P. 744, wherein it was held 
.. that: if ·a party -making -i:tnprovements on realty 
holds- .possession' of the land under ~-a lease, or by 
virtue of a license where its authority is coupled 
. wfth- an ·interest, snch· party· is the ·owner of the 
land within the me-chanic's Jien act. _ .. _Horn v. Clark 
Hardware Co., 54 Colo. 522, 131 P. 405, 45 L.R.A., 
N. S., 100. See, also, H·o:tne Public ~-Market' Co. v. 
Fallis, 72 Colo. -48, 209 P. 641, -in which we held 
that an option' for a· lease ·-which·, later ripened into 
a ninety-nine :year le-ase• was sufficient ownership 
on which .the lien would- attaclh, and--Bankers' B . 
.-&'L. Ass'n v.--Fleming'Bros.--Luniber_. Co., \83 Colo. 
335, 264 p. 1087:" 
· 2. -'The Trial Oou.ft ·Erred ''In N/J·t .. 8ii;S~a·1Jh;,ing De-
fenmant1' s 'Objections '.And-.'MlJt~ons To Strike The 
Evidence Of The Witvness Gaddis. 
at is clear from·.the.·reeord~that-mos-t;of,the tran-
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sactions were handled for Whiteley by Mr. Gaddis of the 
real estate company as agent for Whiteley. AS' to the 
nature of the DeVries ·deed, all of Gaddis' testimony 
are conclusion 'of the witness and what his understanding 
was. All of this evidence was objected to or motions to 
strike were made. This evidence was necessary to show 
that the warranty deed was in fact a mortgage. It is our 
position that if this p;urported evidence had been ex-
cluded the plaintiff failed to show what he contends was 
the nature of the tran'Saction. As an illustration of the 
conclusions of the witness Gaddis: we cite the following in 
the record, (Record pp. 89-90). 
'' Q. And did you consult with Mr. Whiteley con-
cerning this additional loan~ 
''A. He ~agr"<eed to let them have six hundred dollars 
if they would let him have a warranty deed. 
'' Q. Did he .tell you that he would take the deed 
only as security? 
''A. That is right. 
''Q. And Mr. and Mrs. DeVries, when you talked 
to them, did they understand that?· 
''A. They understood they we:ve to give security for 
the six hundred dollars. 
"Q. . It :w~asn 't intefnde~d as a transf·er of the lee 
(f·ee) ·in the property was it? 
... ~. 
''A. It was not.'' 
A motion was made to strike all of the testimony 
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of Gaddis relating to the condition under which the de·e·d 
was given (Record pp. 97-99). This motion was denied 
by the court. At no place did Mr. Gaddis testify as to 
a conversation which would show the intent of the parties 
when the deed was given. Everything said by him was 
his conclusion. 
Section 132 of 36 A me~ Jwrisprudence, page 754 
. provides: 
' '·The mutu·al intention of the parties to an 
instrument which is absolute on its face, that such 
instrument should operate as -a mortgage, must be 
shown by direct evidence or by the circumstances 
of the case. • • * • '' 
The burden is on th.e person ass·erting that ·a deed 
is in fact a mortgage. 
Section 133 of 36 Americam Jurispnuience, ·pages 
754-755 provides : 
''There is authority in support of a presump-
tion that an absolute conveyance with a covenant 
of warranty and with-out a defeasance either· in 
the conveyance or in a collateral instrument is 
what it p·urports to be. In any event, the authori-
ites are unanimously agreed that the burden of 
introducing evidence to prove that an absolute 
conveyance, unaccompanied by ·any written stipu-
lation for reconveyance, was intended to operate 
·as a mortgage rests on th·e party alleging that 
intention. ' ' 
In this case upon the execution of the warranty deed 
no note evidencing the obligation was giv~ nor was there 
any written agreement for reconve·yance. It appears 
affirmatively that revenue stamp~s were ·attached to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
deed and it was recorded. No reven~e stamp~s are re-
quired for the recordation of a mortgage. Without the 
conclusions of the witness Ga:ddis there is no competant 
evidence which would sustain the burden of proof im-
posed· upon the plaintiff. We submit that the evidence 
should have been excluded and that it was reversable 
error on the part of the court not to do so. 
C10NCLUSION 
We submit that the plaintiff and his agent by their 
conduct subordinated the mortgage lien, if any, to the 
mechanic's lien of the defendant Ewell. The plaintiff did 
not sustain the burden of ·establishing that the warranty 
deed given was in fact a mortgage. 'The judgm·ent of the 
trial court should be reversed an~d the lien of the defend-
ant Ewell be declared paramount to the lien of the 
plaintiff. 
Respectfully sub~tted, 
c.RITCHLOW, WATS.ON and W ARNO;CK 
Attorneys fOr Aippel~(J!J'tt M. L. Ewell 
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